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Article 4

COGNITIVE FOUNDATIONS
OF THE IMPULSE TO BLAME*

Lawrence M. Solant
At a prominent New York law firm, the associates
playfully refer to their telephone extensions as their "blame
codes." "Did you ever get in touch with the clerk about filing
the TRO?" "No." "Sounds like blame code 443 to me." The
intuitions of these semi-fictional characters are sound. Once
something goes wrong, it is only natural to assign
responsibility to someone for the ensuing unfortunate state of
affairs. We do not necessarily decide to blame others, we just do
it.
Psychological research suggests that moral judgment, at
least initially, involves intuition based on experience rather
than studied reason.1 Responsibility and blame are
preliminarily assigned quickly as a result of one's perception of
events matching mental models of blameworthiness. Later,
more refined analysis is possible. "Dual process theories" in
psychology suggest that many decisions are based first on
rapid, intuitive evaluations of situations, with subsequent
reasoning available only later.! The rapid judgment of

© 2003 Lawrence M. Solan. All Rights Reserved.
Professor of Law and Director, Center for the Study of Law, Language and
Cognition, Brooklyn Law School. Visiting Fellow, Department of Psychology, Princeton
University (2003). My thanks to John Darley, Joshua Knobe, Michael Madow and Dan
Simon for valuable advice concerning the psychological literature, and to Marji Molavi
for her excellent contributions to this project as my research assistant. An earlier
version of this Article was presented at the meeting of the Association for the Study of
Law, Culture and Humanities in New York, March 2003. I am grateful for very helpful
comments from the other members of the panel: Len Kaplan, Vincent Rinella, Andy
Weiner and Gabriel Ricci.
1 See Johathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail; A Social
IntuitionistApproach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814 (2001).
' For a collection of articles, see DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999).
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blameworthiness happens so quickly and so effortlessly that I
call it here "the impulse to blame."
This Article examines some of the cognitive structures
that trigger this impulse. It argues that the ease with which we
blame arises in part from the fact that the impulse's triggers
consist of cognitive elements that we use routinely and
completely independent of moral judgment in everyday life.
This impulse is a combination of cognitive and emotional
responses to bad events. It is largely a by-product of other,
morally-neutral aspects of our psychology-the attribution of
cause, recognition of good and bad outcomes and the drive to
theorize about what others have in mind when they speak or
act. Thus, being a moral actor is "inexpensive" in the sense that
to attribute blame requires very little other than the
implementation of structures that serve other purposes.
The ease with which we blame has its consequences.
First, to the extent that this impulse occurs just when our
theory of morality says that indignation is appropriate, it
means that people are designed to be moral actors.
Correspondingly, to the extent that the impulse's triggers are
at odds with notions of justice and fair play, a society must
ensure that its legal order corrects for any such mismatches.
And we do. For example, I describe research that puts
causation (or at least contribution) at the center of the blame
impulse. But we do not want to blame people for every harm
they cause, and we want to distinguish among different causal
situations. Doctrines of justification and excuse are examples of
some solutions to the problem of overblaming. Similarly, some
conduct is blameworthy even if no harm resulted.
Responsibility for inchoate crimes, such as attempted criminal
activity, is a solution to underblaming.'
Second, if we are aware of the impulse, consciously or
subliminally, we may wish to undermine its application for a
variety of reasons by not acknowledging triggering events as
such. One can avoid blame by altering the evidentiary
standards for finding that the triggering factors apply, by
denying the facts themselves or by selecting alternative stories,

In fact, empirical research suggests that our system does not adequately
punish some inchoate crimes according to people's everyday moral sense. PAUL H.
ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY VIEWS AND
THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995).
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consistent with the facts but inconsistent with blaming one
party instead of another.4
These "avoidance" techniques can be seen as second
order effects of the blame impulse. They have serious
ramifications in both everyday life and in the legal decisionmaking process. For example, the drive to create narratives
consistent with the facts, but which do not trigger the blame
impulse, is characteristic of the litigation process, as noted by
many scholars.' More generally, it is not uncommon for people
to blame the victim under a variety of circumstances, such as
when the person making judgment has more in common with.
the perpetrator, or when blaming the victim is more consistent
with the judgment-maker's view of the world as just.6
Philosophers who write about responsibility and blame,
such as Jeffrie Murphy and Jean Hampton,7 P.F. Strawson'
and R. Jay Wallace,9 discuss the relationship between blame
and emotion, and recognize that emotions have a cognitive
basis. ° This Article agrees with that position, and offers a
broader cognitive foundation for blaming.
Part I describes the circumstances in which the impulse
to blame is triggered in everyday life. Part II then examines
some of the cognitive structures that underlie the blame
impulse. Finally, Part III focuses on second order effects: What
do we do to avoid blaming people whom we would rather not
blame, and what do we do to increase the likelihood of blaming
those whom we would like to blame? A brief conclusion
explores some ramifications of the ease with which we blame in
designing a system of justice.

4 For a discussion from a social psychological perspective, see Mark D.
Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 556, 566-68
(2000) [hereinafter Culpable Control]; Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation, 63 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 368 (1992).
5 See, e.g., ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER,
MINDING THE LAW

(2000); BERNARD S. JACKSON, MAKING SENSE IN LAW: LINGUISTIC, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
SEMIOTIC PERSPECTIVES (1995).
6 There is substantial literature on this issue.
For a recent contribution that
summarizes some of the history, see Melvin J. Lerner & Julie H. Goldberg, When Do
Decent People Blame Victims?, in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY,
supra note 2, at 627; SHARON LAMB, THE TROUBLE WITH BLAME: VICTIMS,
PERPETRATORS, & RESPONSIBILITY (1996).
7
8

JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JEAN HAMPTON, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY (1988).
P.F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY

OF THOUGHT AND ACTION (P.F. Strawson ed., 1968).
9 R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS (1994).
10 See MURPHY & HAMPTON, supra note 7, at 5 n.7.
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WHEN WE BLAME

Probably the best way to characterize the process by
which we assign blame is with reference to cognitive schemata.
Three decades ago, the psychologist Harold Kelley suggested
that various causal schemata are at the center of attribution
decisions." He described causal schema as follows:
In general, a causal schema is a conception of the manner in which

two or more causal factors interact in relation to a particular kind of
effect. A schema is derived from experience in observing cause and
effect relationships from experiments in which deliberate control has
been exercised over causal factors, and from implicit and explicit

teaching about the causal structure of the world. It enables a person
to perform certain operations with limited information, and
thereby
2
to reach certain conclusions or inferences as to causation.

Kelley presents a number of examples, such as our ability to
understand from experience that some effects may result from
a limited set of causes, each of which is sufficient, but none of
which is individually necessary." When we experience the
effect, we can infer that at least one of the causes is present as
well.
Psychologists continue to associate attribution with
causation, but the schemata have become more complex. Mark
Alicke suggests that blame has three components: mental
states, behaviors and consequences. 4 The mental and behavior
components of blame correspond to volitional and causal
control. In the prototypical blame situation, someone with a
culpable mental state behaves unacceptably, leading to a bad
result. According to Alicke, the key factor in determining
whether we assign blame to an individual, and if so how much
blame, is the amount of control that the individual exercised
over the situation, whether through bad acts or bad motives."
This consideration is independent of causation, although
experiments show that it contributes to people's judgments of
causation. Alicke found that people are more likely both to find
" Harold H. Kelley, Causal Schemata and the Attribution Process, in
ATTRIBUTION: PERCEIVING THE CAUSES OF BEHAVIOR 151 (Edward E.
1972). See KELLY G. SHAVER, THE ATTRIBUTION OF BLAME (1985)

refinement of this perspective.
12 Kelley, supra note 11, at 152.
" Id. at 154-55.
14 Alicke, Culpable Control, supra note 4, at 557;
note 3, at 188-89.
'5 Alicke, Culpable Control, supra note 4.

Jones et al. eds.,
for considerable

ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra
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causation and to assign liability when a person performs a bad
act for a bad reason. In one experiment, for example,
participants considered a person who got into a car accident
rushing home with an anniversary gift for his parents to be less
of a cause of the accident than a person rushing home to hide
some illegal drugs, even when the rest of the facts were exactly
the same."6
We will see below how affective considerations, such as
bad motives and unsympathetic suspects, contribute to
assigning blame. It is important to note, however, that no one
rejects causal models as irrelevant. If I cause a car accident
and leave the scene, one cannot sensibly claim that my
neighbor should be blamed simply because my neighbor is not a
likeable person and performs bad acts more often than I do.
Yet, if the facts about the accident are in dispute, these
negative feelings about my neighbor may color the
investigation, and motivate the investigators to find fault in
him rather than in me. If we know in advance that looking at
an event in a particular way will lead us to assign blame, that
knowledge may motivate us to perceive the event differently.
These experiences are examples of "observer bias," a
commonplace phenomenon in the legal system."
Moreover, when more than one causal scenario is
available and consistent with some version of the facts, one has
no choice but to select among them. As Dan Kahan observed,
the fact that blaming involves more than the logic of causation
is not just a matter of noise entering the system. It is an
important aspect of how we assign moral judgment. 8 While
this Article continues to look at blame in terms of causal
schemata, we return later to how people decide which model of
an event to accept when the facts make more than one
available.
What do these cognitive schemata look like? The
linguist Anna Wierzbicka has written about "cognitive
scenarios" associated with emotions, including negative ones

16
17

Alicke, Culpable Causation,supra note 4, at 370.
For discussion, see D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho

Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation
and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2002).
18 Professor Kahan made this important observation
forcefully during the
Symposium. Dan Kahan, The Aesthetics of Blame in Criminal Law, Remarks at the
Brooklyn Law School Center for the Study of Law, Language & Cognition Symposium,
Responsibility & Blame: Psychological & Legal Perspectives (Oct. 18, 2002).
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that we associate with blame. 9 According to Wierzbicka, many
emotional responses emanate from reactions to good and bad
events. Among the emotions that stem from bad events are
sadness, unhappiness, outrage, grief, anger and distress."
Others, such as anxiety, fear, panic and nervousness, involve
concern about bad things happening in the future.
Psychologists write similarly about assigning positive and
negative valences to events.2 '
Interestingly, the elements of Wierzbicka's cognitive
scenarios for emotional responses contain, by and large, the
same elements that psychologists propose in describing the
circumstances under which we blame. For example, Wierzbicka
describes circumstances in which we might say that someone is
angry. One such scenario is as a reaction to the harm caused by
another. We say that someone is angry in the following
situation:
Sometimes a person thinks: "Something bad happened because
someone did (didn't do) something. I don't want things like this to
happen. I want to do something because of this if I can." When this
22
person thinks this, this person feels something bad.

That bad feeling, Wierzbicka maintains, is anger. The
somewhat juvenile-sounding tone of the scenario is not
accidental. The tone reflects the fact that the scenario uses
primitives that are by and large universal in the expression of
emotion in languages around the world. There are few such
universals; those that do exist are very basic.23 Were the
scenarios that describe emotional responses not expressed in
such basic terms, it would be difficult to account for their
universality.
Negative emotional experiences generally, according to
Wierzbicka, stem from scenarios that include, "something bad
happened."24 Sadness, for example, comes from a more passive

'9

ANNA

WIERZBICKA,

EMOTIONS

ACROSS

LANGUAGES

AND

CULTURES:

DIVERSITY AND UNIVERSALS (1999).
21

Id. at 60-90.

21

See SHAVER, supra note 11, at 3.

22 Id. at 89.
23

Judge Posner argues that the paucity of moral universals makes it unlikely

that moral theory can inform legal theory in a meaningful way. While this Article does
not take a position on that issue, Wierzbicka's work certainly supports Posner's factual
statement about there not being a great number of moral universals. See Richard A.
Posner, The Problernaticsof Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1637 (1998).
24 WIERZBICKA, supra note 19, at 60.
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reaction to bad outcomes.25 Of course, emotions can combine.
One can feel sad and helpless with respect to the negative
result and simultaneously angry at its cause. In fact, this
mixture of feelings is commonplace.
Each of these reactions comes first from a perception of
something that happened in the world, and then from one's
thoughts about the events. For reasons that Alicke explains,
the perceptions of what happened need not be accurate. 6 We
can attribute an event to someone because a causal schema is
present, but we can be wrong about causation in this particular
instance. In other words, we are all casual causal profilers in
everyday life.
Philosophers writing about blame often associate it with
emotions of resentment and indignation," sometimes called
"moral sentiments." Wierzbicka describes indignation as a
person thinking: "I know now: someone did something bad. I
didn't think someone could do something like this. I don't want
things like this to happen. I want to say what I think about
this," and experiencing negative feelings as a result.2 9 The
reaction is a complicated one, involving an undesired outcome,
bad conduct, surprise at the bad conduct and a negative
emotional reaction as a result of experiencing these things.
I do not claim that Wierzbicka has captured all of the
nuances of these emotional reactions, or that the relationship
between blame and emotion can be reduced to a single emotion.
Nonetheless, what triggers blame and what triggers such
emotions as anger seem very similar. To capture the
relationship between blame and negative emotional reaction to
events, let us posit the following as a typical scenario that
triggers blame:
Sometimes a person thinks: "Something bad happened because
someone did (didn't do) something. (That person should have known
better.) I don't want things like this to happen. When I think about
the bad thing that happened, I also think about the fact that this
person did something to make it happen."

Thus, blaming involves focusing on the wrongdoer when
thinking about an undesirable outcome that the wrongdoer has
25 Id. at 62.
'6
27

Alicke, Culpable Control, supra note 4, at 567.
See Jean Hampton, Forgiveness, Resentment and Hatred, in FORGIVENESS

AND MERCY, supra note 7, at 35, 56.
'8 See generally WALLACE, supra note 9.
2

Id. at 90.
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caused. The scenario has all three elements of Alicke's control
theory: state of mind, a causal connection and a bad outcome. °
Blaming seems so close to negative emotions that it is
tempting to call blaming itself an emotional response. The
same things, more or less, that lead to anger and indignation
trigger blame as well. We could then say that holding someone
responsible is a societal response to an emotional reaction
based on a causal schema. But we routinely blame situations
for bad outcomes with little emotional commitment. Especially
relevant is our propensity to blame inanimate forces. Consider
the following sentence, taken from a recent newspaper article:
"A cold front, not Hurricane Lili, was to blame for last night's
storm system, officials said."3 ' It is easy enough to find or
construct other examples. Moreover, some cultures tend to
focus blame more on situations than on people, suggesting the
salience of alternative cognitive scenarios in those cultures.32
On the other hand, we sometimes experience anger
without blame. Consider a parent who is angry at a child for
leaving a bicycle outside unlocked, allowing it to be stolen. The
parent feels anger toward the child for his carelessness, but
does not care at all about the bicycle, perhaps because it was
already in bad shape and too small for the child. In this
situation, it would be strange to say that the parent blames the
child for the loss of the bicycle, notwithstanding the parent's
irritation.
As for the volitional component of blame, the more we
can say that someone should have known better,33 the more
blameworthy that person is. Intentionally vicious acts, for
example, are worse than negligent ones. Studies repeatedly
show a relationship between the assignment of responsibility
on the one hand, and the bad actor's state of mind on the
other.34 The cognitive scenario for blame captures this sense by
including the sentence "that person should have known better"

30

Alicke, Culpable Control,supra note 4, at 557.

31 Shannon Tangonan & Chris Quay, Tornadoes are Reported During Storm,

COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Oct. 5, 2002, at lB.
32 See, e.g., Tanya Menon et al., Culture and the Construal of Agency:
Attribution to Individual Versus Group Dispositions, 76 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 701 (1999).
33 Bailey Kuklin, You Should Have Known Better, 48 U. KAN. L. REV 545,
546
(2000).
31 See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 3; Alicke, Culpable Causation,
supra
note 4, at 370; Alicke, Culpable Control,supra note 4, at 559-61.
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in parenthesis to indicate both that it is not a necessary
element and that it is itself graded.
A separate problem exists with respect to the causal
element of the blame scenario. Just as there are progressively
more culpable states of mind, there are progressively more
direct causes. The law recognizes this in such concepts as
proximate causation, and even "efficient proximate causation,"
a concept still used in determining the liability of insurers in
some states.35 I will defer dealing with this issue until we more
closely examine different ways in which we express causation.
Finally, while I have argued for the distinction between
blaming and emotion, I have said little about the relationship
between the two. Several possible accounts are consistent with
what I have said thus far. It is possible that the cognitive
scenario that triggers blame also triggers emotional responses
such as anger, resentment and sadness. At that point, the
emotion and the impulse to blame reinforce each other. This
version can be described in terms of a causal fork: 6 A single
scenario triggers two responses-blame and anger/resentment.
But it is also possible to describe the relationship as a causal
chain: The cognitive scenario triggers the emotional reaction as
Wierzbicka describes,37 and the impulse to blame derives from
the emotional response. After all, the characteristic of blame is
associating causal attribution with the bad act. Anger and
resentment are certainly good enough to provoke such focus.
Conversely, it may be that recognizing blameworthy conduct as
such helps to trigger an emotional response as well, as when
we say, "how dare she!" In his contribution to this Symposium,
Neal Feigenson describes a number of different ways in which
emotion and attribution of responsibility can interact, and I
agree with his position.38
II.

WHAT MAKES IT EASY TO BLAME?

Now let us examine more closely some interesting
aspects of the cognitive scenario that triggers blame. As noted,
'5 See, e.g., Tento Int'l, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 222 F.3d 660
(9th Cir. 2000).
'6 P.N. Johnson-Laird, Causation,Mental Models, and the Law, 65 BROOK. L.
REV. 67, 93 (1999).
37 See WIERZBICKA, supra note 19, at 87-90 (describing scenarios for anger
and indignation).
3' Neal R. Feigenson, Emotions, Risk Perceptionsand Blaming in 9/11 Cases,
68 BROOK. L. REV. 959 (2003).
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blaming seems to be triggered by a model whose prototypical
instantiation has three elements: a bad state of affairs,
causation and a culpable state of mind. Did evolution give us
these cognitive structures for the sake of making us moral
actors? We can never know. But we can look at some linguistic
evidence that shows us using each of these constructs in
everyday life without regard to moral content. In short, it
appears that our strong impulse to attribute responsibility is
built upon constructs that we need and use independently of
moral judgment. Below I examine a few of them: our perception
of events based on causal schemata; our distinguishing
between good and bad outcomes; and our use of state of mind in
the acquisition of concepts. The presence of the blame impulse's
building blocks in everyday thought may, at least to some
extent, explain some of the reasons it is so easily triggered.
A.

Event Structure

This Section makes the following argument: We
conceptualize the world in terms of events and we
conceptualize events in terms of cause and result. We do all of
this automatically and in circumstances having little or
nothing to do with moral attribution, which means that use of
these constructs in the attribution of responsibility comes with
little cognitive cost.
1. Events as Units of Analysis in Everyday Life
For many years, linguists and philosophers of language
have considered events to have ontological status in language
the same way that objects do. Compare the following:
(1) a. The bird flew into the nest.
b. The yellow bird with the red beak flew into the
nest.
These two sentences can be used to describe the same event in
the world. The second sentence entails the first, and provides
more information about the bird than does the first. Now
consider the sentences in (2), taken from Ernest Lepore, a
philosopher who writes about the relationship between
language and logic:
(2) a. "The dog bit the man in the park."

THE IMPULSE TO BLAME
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b. "The dog bit the man in the park after midnight
on Wednesday under his arm."39
Just as (1)(b) entails (1)(a), (2)(b) entails (2)(a). But the
difference between the sentences in (2) is not in the detail
concerning an object, but rather in the detail concerning an
event: The event of the dog biting the man. A theory of
semantics should be able to account both for the entailments
themselves and for the similarity between the entailments in
(1) and (2). Creating a logic that performs operations on both
objects and events accomplishes both tasks.4 °
There are other reasons for believing that our language
uses events as primitives. Consider (3), also taken from
Lepore:4
(3) John buttered his toast, and he did it after midnight.
Or consider (4):
(4) It just happened again!
Both of these sentences contain the pronoun it. But it
does not refer to an object in either of these sentences. Rather,
it refers to an event. In (3), the event is buttering toast. In (4),
we don't know what the event is. It refers to a concept of an
event that the speaker has in mind and presumably the hearer
can understand through context. In fact, you can utter (4) even
if no one has said anything else and it would still be
appropriate in the right circumstances. This does not mean
that it in (4) is not a pronoun or, for that matter, that it is not
the subject of the sentence. It is both. But it does mean that we
can use pronouns to refer to events that we have in mind,
something we can do only if we actually have events in mind.
As the linguist Ray Jackendoff explains, examples like these
provide linguistic evidence that we conceptualize in terms of
events and that this conceptualization makes its way into some
rather technical aspects of linguistic knowledge.42

'9 ERNEST LEPORE, MEANING AND ARGUMENT 286-87 (2000). See Donald

Davidson, The Logical Form of Action Sentences, in THE LOGIC OF DECISION AND
ACTION 81 (1967).

" For a detailed exposition of the role of events in formal semantics, see
TERENCE PARSONS, EVENTS IN THE SEMANTICS OF ENGLISH: A STUDY IN SUBATOMIC

SEMANTICS (1990).
41 LEPORE, supra note 39, at 288.
42 For other arguments concerning the role of pro-forms

in semantic

interpretation, see RAY JACKENDOFF, FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE: BRAIN, MEANING,

GRAMMAR, EVOLUTION 315-18 (2002).
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2. Causation in the Structure of Events
The ontological status of events in language is relevant
to this discussion because we often characterize events in
terms of cause and result. Psychologists have studied how
people structure events. An interesting set of studies by Jeffrey
Zacks, Barbara Tversky and their colleagues suggests that
events are structured around their object.43 For example, people
understand making a bed as an event that ends when the bed
is made. To the extent that the entire purpose of the event is to
effectuate the result, their findings mean that people structure
events around causation and result. The fact that event
perception is purposeful is akin to Alicke's notion that blame is
based on control." If we look at events in everyday life
according to their object, then it should not be surprising that
we look at events that way in assigning blame. That's just the
way we look at events.
3. Causation in Everyday Speech
In everyday speech, we typically do not use the word
cause to express causation. Rather, causation is such a basic
part of our conceptualization that is part of the meaning of
many verbs that we use routinely. Consider the following
classic examples from the linguistic literature, which John
Darley and I discuss in an article on causation and legal
liability:45
(5) a. Bill broke the vase.
b. The vase broke.
We understand these sentences as related to one another. (5)(a)
means something like (6):
(6) Bill CAUSED the vase to break.
Other examples include: "Bill baked a cake" (the cake baked),
"Bill burned the toast" (the toast burned) and "Bill opened the
door" (the door opened). 6
43 Jeffrey M. Zacks & Barbara Tversky, Event Structure
in Perception and
Conception, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3 (2001); Jeffrey M. Zacks et al., Perceiving,
Remembering, and Communicating Structure in Events, 130 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 29 (2001).
44 Alicke, Culpable Control, supra
note 4.
45 Lawrence M. Solan & John M. Darley, Causation,Contribution,
and Legal
Liability: An Empirical Study, 64 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 265 (2001).
46 For detailed discussion of these alternations, see BETH LEVIN
& MALKA
RAPPAPORT HOVAV, UNACCUSATviTY AT THE SYNTAX-LEXICAL SEMANTICS INTERFACE
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Now consider the following sentences, discussed in a
article
on certain sentences called resultatives:
recent
(7) "Ms. Bates, are you mad to let your niece sing
herself hoarse in this manner?"
(8) "Leslie scrubbed her knees sore."47
To "sing oneself hoarse" means to sing until the singing causes
one to become hoarse. Again, causation is built into the
meaning of the expression, without reference to it as a separate
linguistic item.
Of course, we can express causation separately. We can
use the word "cause" itself or, in English, we can use the verb
"make" to indicate causation:
(9) Look what you made me do.
The verb "make" is called the "periphrastic" causation marker
in English.48 It is often used to express causation in situations
that cannot use a causative verb. Consider (10):
(10) Mr. Mathis made the unruly student leave the room.
We can't say, "Mr. Mathis left the unruly student" to mean that
he caused the student to leave. Note, in contrast, that when it
is possible to express causation by using a causative verb,
using the verb "make" instead of the causative verb implies
indirect causation:
(11) Mr. Mathis made the unruly student stand by the
window.
Here, we really could have said that he "stood" the student by
the window. The use of the periphrastic marker suggests that
no physical contact was involved.
An even more indirect means of expressing causation
when a causal verb is available is to use the verb "cause," as
(12) illustrates:
(12) Mr. Mathis caused the unruly student to stand by
the window.
Here we really don't know what Mr. Mathis did, but the
implication is that it was indirect and perhaps unusual.
For the most part, we call all of this causation. Yet,
consider the following sentence:
(13) The colonel let the soldiers sleep outside in the
field.
79-133 (1995).
47 Malka Rappaport Hovav & Beth Levin, An Event Structure Account of
English Resultatives, 77 LANGUAGE 766, 767, 780 (2001).
4"8For discussion of this concept, see LEVIN & HOVAV, supra note 46, at 293
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Is this causation? If by "let" we mean "made," then perhaps it
is. If "let" means "allowed" then we would probably not consider
it to be a matter of causation. The question becomes important
if one of the soldiers becomes ill from having been exposed to
the elements all night. Should we blame the colonel? It depends
on whether we believe that the colonel was a cause of the bad
results.
In fact, people frequently do not distinguish between
enablement and causation, although logicians do. Darley and I
presented subjects with a story about a car owner who left his
key in the ignition, later to learn that it was stolen by a
teenager who got into an accident.49 Subjects were divided over
whether the key-leaver could be said to have caused the
accident, or whether he was only an enabler. Of those who
found him to be only an enabler, about half thought he should
be held liable for tort damages, while just about everyone who
thought he was a cause thought he should be held liable."
Thus, many look at enablement as a matter of indirect
causation. In fact, some languages have separate words for
direct and indirect causation, with enablement being part of
the latter class of verbs."'
4. Causation and Cognitive Scenarios for Blame
It appears, then, that causation is not a unitary concept.
Causal schemata vary with the directness of the cause. Yet, we
can blame for any level of directness. Part III of this Article
looks at public opinion polls from the United States and
Muslim countries on the question of who was responsible for
the destruction of the World Trade Center in 2001. Consider
the following possibilities, some of which reflect public opinion
in different parts of the world:
(14) a. Arab terrorists destroyed the World Trade Center.
b. The United States made terrorists destroy the
World Trade Center.
c. The United States caused terrorists to destroy the
World Trade Center.
d. The United States created circumstances that
legitimized terrorists in some quarters and
See Solan & Darley, supra note 45.
50 Id. at 289-90.
51 Id. at 295-96 (discussing the expression of causation in Dutch).
49
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provided them with motivation to destroy the
World Trade Center.
e. The United States destroyed the World Trade
Center.
The consensus in the United States is that (a) is true.
Those who blame the United States, in whole or in part, for the
World Trade Center disaster typically would subscribe to (d),
although some in Muslim countries subscribe to (e), as opinion
polls discussed below show.52 But I believe most everyone would
agree that (a) and (e) are far more blameworthy scenarios than
is (d). The use of the causative verb "destroy" instead of either
words of enablement or a periphrastic causal verb ("make" or
"cause") implies direct involvement, which we consider more
culpable. It appears, then, that we do distinguish between
direct and indirect cause in assigning blame. This has been
demonstrated experimentally. Darley and I found that
participants considered the teenager who stole the car subject
to more liability than the person who left the key in the
ignition.5 3 Yet, we remain uncomfortable equating (a) and (d)
even if only by putting them at different places on the same
continuum. If acknowledging (d) is psychologically tantamount
to admitting (e), we have good reason to avoid thinking about
(d) altogether. As Part III demonstrates, this sort of denial
process is commonplace.
B.

Good and Bad Outcomes

Returning to Wierzbicka's analysis of emotion words,
different cultures have different concepts with which they
categorize emotions. Sometimes the differences are subtle;
sometimes they are huge. In fact, there are very few universals
when it comes to emotions. Among the universals that do exist
are expressions of anger, feeling good and feeling bad, and
recognizing that good and bad things happen. 4
Joshua Knobe has recently performed a simple but
elegant experiment that shows one way that good and bad
outcomes are part of our everyday thinking.5 5 He presented
each subject with one of two stories. The first read:
52 See infra note 76.

Solan & Darley, supra note 45 at 293.
WIERZBICKA, supra note 19, at 276-89.
55 Joshua Knobe, Intentional Action and Side-Effects in Ordinary Language,
ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2003).
54
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The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board
and said, "We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us
-increase profits, but it will also harm the environment."
The chairman of the board answered, "I don't care at all about
harming the environment. I just want to make as much profit as I
can. Let's start the new program."
They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was
harmed.6

Subjects were asked how much blame the chairman deserved
for the harm to the environment, and whether they thought the
chairman intentionally harmed the environment. 7 Eighty-two
percent of the subjects said the chairman intentionally hurt the
environment, and subjects thought he should receive a great
deal of blame.58
The second story was identical to the first, but instead
of explaining that the process harms the environment, the vicepresident explained that the process helps the environment.59
The chairman answered, "I don't care at all about helping the
environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let's
start the new program. "' ° The result was just the opposite.
Seventy-seven percent said that the chairman did not
intentionally help the environment, and gave him little credit
for having done so."

Knobe's study shows that people react differentially to
good and bad outcomes. The point here is simpler: In order to
make the judgments they did, subjects must have, without
prompting, distinguished between good and bad outcomes.
That we do so routinely is part of what makes possible the
impulse to blame without complex intellectual analysis.
C.

States of Mind

In assigning blame, people care about the actor's state of
mind. In fact, tort law is organized around such distinctions.
Putting aside strict liability, we typically do not hold people
responsible for innocent acts that lead to bad outcomes. We do,
56

Id. (manuscript at 3).

57 Id.

Id. (manuscript at 4).
59 Id.
60
61

Knobe, supra note 55 (manuscript at 4).
Id. (manuscript at 4).
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however, hold them responsible for being negligent ("you
should have known better") and we permit punitive damages
for people who are reckless or who knowingly cause harm.
Criminal law makes similar distinctions, but draws its lines
elsewhere.
Experimentally, Darley and I found a bootstrapping
effect with respect to state of mind. Returning to the keyleaver, we varied his state of mind from innocent to negligent
(leaving the keys because he was late to a meeting) to knowing
(wanting his car stolen for the insurance money). 2 We found
that not only did subjects assign more liability the worse the
state of mind, but that intentionally bad actors were perceived
to have contributed more to the accident causally.63 Alicke
reached similar conclusions in his studies of causation.6 4
One interesting aspect of state of mind is how it comes
to be that we even consider what others are thinking.
Strawson, in his essay Freedom and Resentment, calls the fact
that we do so a "commonplace," which forms the basis for much
of his discussion:
The central commonplace that I want to insist on is the very great
importance that we attach to the attitudes and intentions towards us
of other human beings, and the great extent to which our personal
feelings and reactions depend upon, or involve, our beliefs about
65
these attitudes and intentions.

If taking into account the thoughts of others were
limited to the work of a careful moral thinker after
considerable analysis of the blameworthiness of others, it
would be surprising to find people using such information so
reflexively. The harder it is to consider the thoughts of others,
the more work it takes to attribute fault, and the less impulsive
blaming should be.
In fact, people use state of mind information for reasons
that have little to do with moral judgment. Developmental
psychologists put it at the center of how children learn
concepts. A mother who points out an elephant at the zoo to her
toddler is really pointing out a large area containing all kinds
of things. The child immediately grasps that the mother is
talking about the elephant because she grasps that the
62

Solan & Darley, supra note 45, at 283-85.

See generally Solan & Darley, supra note 45.
Alicke, Culpable Causation,supra note 4.
61 Strawson, supra.note 8, at 75.
63
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mother's goal is most likely bringing the large animal to the
child's attention. Thus, children learn what elephants are by
seeing them (perhaps in pictures) and by understanding the
state of mind of the person telling them about elephants.
Psychologists call this phenomenon the "theory of
mind"66
approach to concept acquisition, or the "theory
7
theory" approach. There is now extensive research on how and
when children develop a theory of the minds of others. At this
point, it is hard to deny that they do. The observation is an
important one with legal ramifications beyond the scope of this
Article. For example, it means that those who argue that the
law should be less concerned with actors' states of mind are
proposing a change less realistic than they may realize.68 For
present purposes, though, we need only recognize that
attributing a culpable state of mind uses cognitive skills that
we employ daily for purposes other than moral judgment, and
that we do so easily and routinely.
III.

AVOIDING AND DEFLECTING BLAME:

SECOND ORDER

EFFECTS OF THE BLAME IMPULSE

This Part uses two examples to develop a point made at
the beginning of this Article: While blaming may be impulsive
once we have the cognitive scenario that triggers it, we often
have considerable latitude in how we conceptualize the world
and can accept or reject alternative scenarios of the same
event.
Psychologists have demonstrated convincingly that
people routinely evaluate evidence of causal theories in a selfserving manner in order to avoid reaching unwanted
conclusions. In an ingenious study, Ziva Kunda had both male
and female subjects read a newspaper story about the effects of
caffeine on women's health. 9 The article "associated caffeine
with fibrocystic disease, reportedly associated with often
66 See, e.g., PAUL BLOOM, How CHILDREN LEARN THE MEANINGS OF WORDS

(2000); Jill G. de Villiers & Peter A. de Villiers, Linguistic Determinism and the
Understandingof False Beliefs, in CHILDREN'S REASONING AND THE MIND (P. Mitchell

& K. Riggs eds., 2000).
67 ALISON

GOPNIK &

ANDREW

N.

MELTZOFF, WORDS,

THOUGHTS,

AND

THEORIES (1997).

r See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. REV.
463 (1992).
'9Ziva Kunda, Motivated Inference: Self-Serving Generationand Evaluation
of Causal Theories, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 636 (1987).
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painful lumps in the breast that could go unnoticed in the early
stages but that grew progressively worse with age. The disease
was said to be serious because it was associated in its advanced
stages with breast cancer."" The article further stated that
caffeine caused the disease
by increasing the level of a
71
substance called cAMP.
After completing the article, subjects answered
questions about what they remembered and how convincing
they found the arguments. They were subsequently questioned
about their consumption of caffeine. 72 The study revealed that
women who were heavy caffeine users found the arguments
less convincing than women who were light caffeine users, but
caffeine intake played no role in how convincing men found the
arguments.73 In other words, the greater the stake one has in
the outcome, the less one will consider evidence likely to trigger
causal attributions that one would like to avoid.
Now let us turn to how people interpret facts to trigger
or avoid blame scenarios. The prototypical situation, in which it
is easiest to blame, involves a bad person doing a bad thing for
a bad reason. 74 Nowhere is this more evident than in the
various reactions to the World Trade Center disaster, which is
addressed below in Section A. Section B then discusses more
legally relevant examples: cases of police brutality discussed by
Susan Bandes in this Symposium 75 and elsewhere, and
experimental evidence on jurors' use of evidence.
A.

The World Trade Center Tragedy: Blaming and
Refusing to Blame

In the year following the destruction of the World Trade
Center, polls showed that many Muslims did not believe that
the hijackers were Arab men. According to one Gallup poll
taken in six Muslim countries, only 18% of those polled
70
71

Id. at 642.

Id.
72 Id. at 642-44.
73 Id. at 643.
74 See Haidt, supra note 1 for a discussion that focuses on the blend
of
rational and affective considerations in assigning blame. Here, I look at some of the
affective considerations in terms of avoiding or encouraging schemata that trigger
blame.
M Susan Bandes, Not Enough Blame to Go Around: Reflections on Requiring
Purposeful Government Conduct, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1195 (2003) [hereinafter Not
Enough Blame]; Susan Bandes, Patternsof Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47
BUFF. L. REV. 1275 (1999) [hereinafter Patternsof Injustice].
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believed that Arabs carried out the attacks, while 61% said
that Arabs were not responsible."6 Assuming these respondents
to be entirely wrong in their assessment of what happened,
their response reflects a complicated moral position.
Why would intelligent people from the Muslim countries
deny facts that seem so well-proven to the rest of us? While
those involved in the deed and their close supporters may wish
to stave off punishment, ordinary people most likely had other
motives. The story probably goes something like this: "I am a
Muslim and know my people. I can't imagine anyone I know
perpetrating such a violent act, which I denounce along with
most of the rest of the world. I would never do so, the people I
know would never do so, and none of us would ever support
such a thing. It must be someone else." In Iran, a more recent
poll found two-thirds responding that the attacks on New York
and Washington were unjustified," yet an earlier poll showed
only 15% believing that Arabs carried out the attack.8
This story has two sides. The first is revulsion and
condemnation of a reprehensible deed-a moral position. The
second part of the story is avoiding the truth. These two parts
of the story are related. The most plausible reason for denying
the obvious, even at the cost of losing one's credibility, is
recognition of the blameworthiness of the acts being denied.
Nonetheless, in addition to being bad strategy, since everyone
else is able to see what happened, denial here is immoral. This
immorality has two aspects. First, taking responsibility for our
actions is a good in itself. The more this happens, the more we
are likely to exercise control over our worst impulses. Second, a
person who turns his back on the truth turns his back on
finding a cure for the evil he denies. If acknowledging
responsibility leads to less societal support of those who foment
violence and hate, then failing to do so can lead to further
violence and hate. A moral actor would want to reduce this
violence-not allow it to escalate on his watch.
Now let us move closer to home, where a similar
dilemma characterized the discourse for months after the
76

In Poll, Islamic World Says Arabs not Involved in 9/11, U.S.A. TODAY, Feb.

27, 2002, at 1A. The countries were: Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan and
Turkey. Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco did not permit this question to be asked.
" Richard Burkholder, IranianReactions to September 11, Gallup Tuesday
Briefing, July 30, 2002, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/tb/gover/Publi/20020730b.asp (last visited Oct. 11, 2002).
" Richard Benedetto, Differences in Perceptions Fuel Mistrust, USA TODAY,
Mar. 5, 2002, at 11A.
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tragedy, and still does to a surprising extent. A poll taken one
year after the attacks by the Globe and Mail of Toronto found
that 84% of Canadians believed that the United States was
wholly or partly responsible for the 9/11 disaster, while only
14% believed that the United States was not to blame at all.79
Canadians blame American foreign policy in the Middle East
and around the world, according to the report.0 Polls show
similar sentiments in Europe, although fewer Europeans blame
Americans than do Canadians."' How do these attitudes
compare with those of Americans? I could find no polls during
that period asking these questions, perhaps because pollsters
assume the responses would so obviously be an overwhelming
rejection of any culpability on the part of the United States. We
do know that 90% of those polled shortly after the attacks
supported military action against those responsible.8 2
What is especially telling is that there has been little
national debate on the matter. For months it was taboo to raise
the issue at all. We dismiss reports like those from Canada,
Europe or the Middle East with no serious substantive
discussion of their merits. It is not difficult to find discussions
of American foreign policy with respect to Iraq (the war there is
ongoing as this volume goes to press), but finding reports with
respect to the destruction of the World Trade Center is
difficult.
Consider in this light the negotiations between
Congress and President Bush over the creation of a commission
to investigate possible intelligence failures prior to 9/11 and to
suggest possible improvements in the gathering and analysis of
intelligence information. From the beginning, this was a
controversial proposal. Opponents, including Vice President
Cheney, protested playing a "blame game" when we should be
focusing
our attention on fighting terrorism.83 The
79 Theresa Ebden, Most CanadiansSay U.S. Shares Blame for Sept. 11, Globe

Says, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 7, 2002.
so Id.
8' Poll: Majority of Europeans Say U.S. Policy to Blame for 9/11, U.S.A.
TODAY, Sept. 4, 2002, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/septll/2002-09-04poll-europeans x.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2003). The poll shows that 63% of the
French, who were polled, blame the United States in part, 51% of Italians doing so,
with percentages in between the two in Great Britain, Germany, Holland and Poland.
82 Frank Newport, Retaliation, Gallup Web page on American sentiment, Oct.
3, 2001 (on file with author).
83 Richard S. Dunham, Five Questions Bush Must Answer,
BUS. WK., May 20,
2002, at http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/may2002/nf20020520_3078.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2003). One such question: "Why did Vice-President Richard
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administration then supported the formation of a commission,
but did not agree to the terms under which such a body could
operate, frustrating members of Congress in both parties, and
families of 9/11 victims who consider the investigation
important.8 Eventually the matter was resolved, and a
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States was established by Title VI of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003." But when the
President named Henry Kissinger as its head, the fighting
began again. Kissinger eventually resigned over his refusal to
comply with ethics rules governing the disclosure of potential
conflicts of interest."
I suggest that the same psychology that caused those
polled in Muslim countries to deny Muslim involvement in the
9/11 attack has caused us to refuse to examine seriously
anything other than retaliation against the perpetrators. I
further suggest that the American response too has both its
moral and immoral elements. On the one hand, focusing on
anything other than the horror of the 9/11 attacks feels like a
dilution of our moral outrage at an unspeakable act of mass
murder. It also smacks of blaming the victim, a dynamic wellstudied." Better not to ask the question if the answer can lead
to misdirecting blame for the criminal acts of others.
But to the extent that we fail to examine American
foreign policy dispassionately, to inquire whether it
legitimately provokes a level of anger that is likely to engender
terrorism and other violent responses, our denial is likely to
lead to more violence. This is not to preordain the result of such
an inquiry. We may decide that American foreign policy is, on
Cheney ask congressional leaders not to investigate the events leading up to
September 11?" Id.
84 Michelle Mittelstadt, Outside Inquiry into 9-11 is Stalled; Victims' Families
Lobbying Vigorously for Bipartisan Commission, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 22,
2002, at 1A.
86 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub.
L. No. 107-306,
116 Stat. 2383, 2408-13 (2002).
8' See David Firestone, Kissinger Pulls Out as Chief Of Inquiry Into 9/11
Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2002, at Al. Subsequently, former New Jersey Governor
Thomas H. Kean was appointed to chair the commission, which was soon to run out of
funding before getting off the ground. An apparent compromise on that issue was
reached in March 2003, as this volume goes to press. Dan Eggen, 9/11 Panel to Receive
More Money; Negotiations Cut Commission's Request by $2 Million, WASH. POST, Mar.
29, 2003, at A4.
87 See supra note 6. Of course, whether one considers this phenomenon
blaming the victim depends upon the extent to which one identifies a country with its
political leaders, a question beyond the scope of this Article.
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balance, good policy regardless of the consequences. But we
cannot justify refusing to ask the questions, even if our refusal
is morally motivated in its own right. When we evaluate
serious crises in which we are not so closely involved, either
historically or contemporaneously, it would never dawn on us
to exclude serious inquiry into the broader circumstances
surrounding the crisis, and to exclude analysis of those
circumstances in our overall evaluation of the situation. It is
not taboo for us today to ask about the circumstances in
Germany between the two world wars that allowed Hitler to
take power, or to look at the circumstances that led to the
French or Russian Revolution, to take some obvious examples.
I do not mean to argue that foreign and American
responses to 9/11 are morally equivalent. But on a
psychological level, the two situations are quite similar. What
is behind the popular reactions in both the Middle East and the
United States is a second order effect of the impulse to blame.
B.

Evidentiary Maneuvers in Legal Contexts

It should be no surprise that a similar dynamic recurs
in legal contexts. Theorists have convincingly argued that legal
fights are often battles between competing narratives.88 To the
extent that blame is involved, which is generally the case in
legal battles, the parties attempt to portray the facts of the
case in a manner that is consistent with blaming only the other
party.
Experiments show how jurors selectively use evidence to
support outcomes they think are just. Kristin Sommer, Irwin
Horowitz and Martin Bourgeois89 presented jury-eligible
participants with a tape recording of a mock products liability
case in which the defendant was at fault, although it
unsuccessfully tried to warn the plaintiff of the danger, and the
plaintiff was also negligent to some extent.9" They presented
different groups with various jury instructions which, if
adhered to, would lead to different outcomes: One set of
subjects was instructed on strict liability, which would
guarantee full recovery to the plaintiff, another on comparative
See supra note 5.
Kristin L. Sommer et al., When JuriesFail to Comply With the Law: Biased
Evidence Processing in Individual and Group Decision Making, 27 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 309 (2001).
90 Id. at 312.
89

1026

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68: 4

negligence, which would result in weighing the relative fault of
the parties in issuing an award, and a third on contributory
negligence, under which the plaintiffs negligence bars recovery
completely.9' In a pre-test of the experimental materials, a
separate group of participants judged the strict and
contributory liability conditions less fair than the comparative
negligence condition.9 2 In the study relevant to this discussion,
participants were divided into six-person juries, which
deliberated after the trial.93 The deliberations were taped.
The results are striking. In reaching a verdict, some
juries followed the judge's instructions (compliant juries),
others did not (noncompliant juries).94 For our purposes, what
is most important is what the juries discussed during the
deliberations. Sommer et al. summarize their findings:
[N]oncompliant juries in the contributory negligence condition
discussed the most proplaintiff evidence and noncompliant juries in
the strict liability condition discussed the least proplaintiff evidence,
whereas compliant juries (including those who nullified the law by
altering damage awards) and those operating under the fair rule of
comparative negligence discussed equal proportions of proplaintiff
information.99

Although I have not discussed all aspects of the results of this
study, the basic message is clear: People tend to maximize the
evidence that supports reaching conclusions they believe to be
fair, and to minimize the evidence that supports conclusions
that they believe not to be fair.
Sometimes the system itself facilitates the avoidance of
blame when the system perceives that it has a stake in the
outcome. Consider Susan Bandes's description of the hurdles
faced by an individual attempting to hold the government
responsible for police brutality in the context of a longstanding
pattern of torture in Chicago:
Complaints are discouraged, confessions are not videotaped, record
keeping is lax or nonexistent, records are sealed or expunged,
patterns are not tracked, and police files are deemed undiscoverable.
If a history of past incidents does exist and, despite these hurdles,
becomes known to the brutality victim, he faces additional hurdles
introducing evidence of the brutality in court, including restrictive
91 Id.
92

Id.

" Id. at 314.
Sommer et al., supra note 89, at 316.

94

95 Id.
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evidentiary rulings, protective orders, judicial toleration of police
perjury or of "the blue wall of silence," assumptions about credibility
that favor police officers, the absolute immunity of testifying officers,
substantive constitutional doctrines insulating failures to act or
demanding an exceptionally high level of proof of wrongdoing,
restrictive municipal liability standards coupled with a lack of
receptivity to evidence of systemic wrongdoing, and standing
6
doctrines that make injunctive relief nearly impossible to obtain.1

Quite obviously, these hurdles are calculated to make it
especially difficult for the legal system to draw the conclusion
that police brutality is a systemic problem. This absolves the
government that runs
the department from the responsibility
97
to see that it stops.

My point here is not that we should suddenly be
shocked that the system of justice is not always just. Rather,
my point is that the ease with which we blame plays such a
huge, albeit tacit role in our lives, including our legal system,
that the lengths to which we are willing to go to avoid blame
are virtually limitless. It is easy enough to compare the legal
maneuvering that Bandes describes with the intellectual
activity that leads to such radically different accounts of the
World Trade Center attacks from one culture to another. 98
CONCLUSION

This Article has explored a notion of blame that results
not from conscious reasoning, but rather from reacting to
cognitive scenarios that trigger it. Much of the Article focused
on what those scenarios may be, and where they come from. All
of the elements of the blame impulse-state of mind, bad
events and causation-function routinely in other psychological
processes. In fact, all are so basic that we could not function
well without them. This means that the impulse to assign
responsibility and blame, while moral, may consist primarily of
Bandes, Patterns of Injustice, supra note 75, at 1279-80.
97 The legal difficulty of attributing blame to a governmental entity, rather
96

than an individual, is the issue that Bandes raises in her contribution to this issue. See
Bandes, Not Enough Blame, supra note 75. There is also a psychological literature that
discusses cultural differences in assigning blame to individuals versus entities. See
Menon et al., supra note 32.
98 In a dramatic announcement, outgoing Governor Ryan of Illinois pardoned
four prisoners on death row in January 2003, who had alleged that they confessed
under torture to the crimes of which they were convicted. Other prisoners on death row
had their sentences commuted. Jodi Wilgoren, 4 Death Row Inmates are Pardoned,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2003, at A13.
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a secondary use of other cognitive tools, just as language uses
parts of the mouth and nose that serve other primary
functions, such as breathing and eating. If this is true, then it
also would not be surprising that the impulse to blame
underdetermines our larger system of moral judgment, which
includes such things as inchoate crimes, justification and
excuse. I conclude with a few words about this larger picture.
Assuming this perspective on responsibility and blame
to be even partly right, it produces both first order and second
order incongruities. The first order incongruities involve
adjustments that a legal order will need to make to compensate
for overblaming and underblaming. This is a matter of legal
doctrine.
The blame impulse suggests that it is no accident that
the legal system is conventionally organized as it is: basic
crimes, inchoate crimes, justification and excuse. Inchoate
crimes fall outside the blame paradigm since they typically
require no bad outcome, and justified and excused conduct fall
inside the blame paradigm. To the extent that the blame
paradigm is the organizing principle, it would suggest that the
conventional taxonomy is not only firmly rooted in a
historically contingent but entrenched system, it is also the
default position in the way we conceptualize responsibility and
blame.
Second, it might be interesting to examine these
doctrines to determine whether they have a different status in
everyday judgments of responsibility and blame. Some work
has been conducted in this regard. Robinson and Darley
performed a set of studies to determine the attitudes of people
concerning responsibility and blame, and to compare those
attitudes with the legal treatment of various situations.9 9
Among their findings was that attempted crimes are viewed to
be almost as blameworthy as successful ones when the person
attempting the crime is in dangerous proximity to the scene.100
People do not necessarily think that the bad marksman is any
less culpable than the good marksman. But the law makes an
enormous distinction, most vividly in jurisdictions that have
capital punishment. In contrast, the law often treats attempts
that are remote, but still sufficient to result in legal liability
more harshly than everyday morality would call for.
ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 3.
'0' Id. at 20.
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Robinson and Darley also looked at how people react to
certain legally acceptable excuses, focusing on cases of
diminished capacity. 101 Briefly, their subjects typically believed
that people who were legally insane for various reasons should
not be punished, but rather should be civilly committed."'
However, there was far less sympathy for people who
committed
crimes
because
they
were
involuntarily
1 3
intoxicated. It would be very useful for research to focus more
on how people react to defendants who enter the judicial
system with a wide variety of problems that make them more
susceptible to conducting their lives outside of socially
acceptable norms.
' In today's world, however, it is perhaps the second order
consequences that are the more interesting. Awareness of the
impulse to blame leads to strategies to avoid acknowledging
the cognitive scenarios that trigger the impulse. This effort to
avoid continues to make the world far more dangerous and the
system of justice somewhat less just.

'0 Id. at 127.
102 Id. at 132.
103 Id. at 141.

